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NOTE
CONSOLIDATED GOLD FIELDS, PLC V. MINORCO, S.A.:




As the number of antitrust cases grows, so does the United States
judiciary's application and expansion of antitrust law. The Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A.' is a
prime example of this expansion. In this case, the Second Circuit used
inapplicable antitrust principles to gain jurisdiction over a foreign
merger. The case, in which a British target company attempted to stop
a Luxembourg-based company's hostile takeover,2 raises important an-
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo American Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part rev'd in part, Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Mi-
norco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (on remand 713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)). This case concerns a foreign target company, Gold Fields, and its partially-
owned subsidiary's desire to seek a preliminary injunction against a foreign corpora-
tion's (Minorco) hostile takeover. Id. at 490. Despite defendant Minorco's assertion of
lack of jurisdiction, it did appear before the United States court to defend its case. 698
F. Supp. at 493.
2. Id. Consolidated Gold Fields is an interesting and unusual case because, unlike
most other international or domestic antitrust suits, it involved a tender offer in the
market of a scarce, precious commodity. Id. This factor appeared to be important in
determining the outcome of the case. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at
501 (distinguishing gold from other commodities because of its homogeneous and lim-
ited nature). For these reasons and because start-up costs for entry into the market are
extremely high, the gold market appeared to the court to be a prime candidate for
monopolization. Id. This case can also be distinguished from most other antitrust cases
because a target company, who might conceivably benefit from the transaction, sought
an injunction rather than the more typical competitor claiming antitrust injury due to a
decrease in competition. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 252.
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titrust questions regarding the applicability of United States antitrust
law to foreign entities.
In the jurisdictional context, Consolidated Gold Fields3 represents
the United States' infringement on the sovereignty of other nations
through the use of its antitrust laws. This infringement is made more
serious by the rapid increase in transnational ownership of securities
and the increase in international mergers and acquisitions.4 Addition-
ally, the increase in the number of applicable antitrust laws of other
nations involved in such transactions will ultimately lead to further ju-
risdictional conflicts.5
In an antitrust context, the potential for conflict between foreign na-
tions and the United States will increase as transnational economic ac-
tivity continues to grow.6 It is in the United States' best interest to ease
these tensions,' because by imposing its law on other countries, the
United States threatens the free flow of goods and capital intended to
benefit the world economy.8 In order to minimize this possibility,
United States courts should exercise care in cases involving significant
foreign interests.9 The court's treatment of standing in Consolidated
Gold Fields also raises important issues about who can bring a lawsuit
under United States antitrust law.'0 The Congress, in developing anti-
trust law," intended to regulate monopolies in order to preserve a high
3. Id. The Second Circuit's opinion did not address the justification for jurisdiction
over the foreign tender offer and failed to offer a comity analysis in the antitrust sec-
tion as it did in the securities law section of the case. Id.
4. See Callcott, Application of U.S. Law to Foreign Transactions-Antitrust
Law-Securities Law: Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 923, 927-29 (1989) (supporting the theory that the Consolidated Gold Fields
ruling infringes on foreign nations' sovereignty and stating that foreign investors' acqui-
sitions are commonplace and will continue to multiply as the European Community's
barriers dissolve).
5. Id. at 928.
6. Id. at 929. The United States has stricter standards, relative to other countries,
for finding market concentration. Id. Nations have objected to the United States' un-
willingness to allow the degree of market concentration which is acceptable in most




10. See generally E. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS (1988) (explaining the various considerations for deter-
mining antitrust standing cases). Standing requires a nexus between the injury to the
plaintiff and the antitrust violation. Id. at 39.
11. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982); Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1982) (serving as the foundation for the
United States antitrust laws). A summary of the antitrust acts relevant to this casenote
are as follows:
The Sherman Act: Section one of the Sherman Act prohibits conduct resulting in the
unreasonable restraint of "trade or commerce with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § I
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level of competition, which benefits society by encouraging price com-
petition, leading to lower priced goods and services.1 2 With these goals
in mind, Congress limited standing to those injured by non-competitive
actions. 3
In Consolidated Gold Fields, the Second Circuit exceeded its au-
thority by granting the target company standing in the absence of a
showing of an antitrust injury. Such a decision conflicts with the Con-
gress' intent that there be a showing of antitrust injury.1 4 Should other
courts adopt the Second Circuit's position that a target need not
demonstrate antitrust injury, then United States antitrust law will lose
some of its credibility and impact.
This note discusses three of the issues posed by Consolidated Gold
Fields: personal jurisdiction, prescriptive jurisdiction, and standing.
Part I provides a historical background of the case. Part II discusses
the requirements for personal jurisdiction, and asserts that the Second
Circuit erred in exercising jurisdiction over Minorco." Part III ex-
plores several approaches to prescriptive jurisdiction and concludes that
the Second Circuit should have refrained from exercising extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over Minorco because of comity considerations.' 6 Part
(1982). See generally Griffin, United States Antitrust Laws and Transnational Busi-
ness Transactions: An Introduction, 21 INT'L LAW. 307, 310 (1987) (explaining the
foundations of the Sherman Act). Congress created this act to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. Id. The Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944), interpreting the Sherman Act, found that
Congress intended to use its power under the Constitution to the utmost extent in re-
straining trade and monopolies. Id.
Congress amended the Sherman Act in 1982 to clarify and limit its application with
regard to export commerce and exclusively foreign transactions. Id. A foreign transac-
tion cannot be challenged under the amended Sherman Act unless the transaction is
likely to have a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States
domestic or import commerce or on United States export trade of an entity involved in
such trade within the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
The Clayton Act, Section 7: This section of the Clayton Act forbids the acquisition of
the stock or assets of a party where the acquisition's effects may act "substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). The potential
anticompetitive effects must occur within the United States and, thus. anticompetitive
effects resulting from a merger which exist outside of the United States are not subject
to the constraints of the statute. Griffin, supra, at 31.
12. See Griffin, supra note I1, at 307 (stating that competition leads to lower
prices, more technological innovation, and the best allocation of economic resources).
13. See E. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, supra note 10, at 39 (citing Blue Shield of
Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477-78) (noting that it was likely that Congress
intended a person to have suffered an antitrust injury in order to attain standing).
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 37-65 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of personal
jurisdiction).
16. See infra notes 66-123 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction).
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IV presents the requirements for antitrust standing and criticizes the
finding by the Second Circuit that Minorco suffered an antitrust in-
jury. 7 Part V recommends that courts apply stricter standards for as-
serting personal jurisdiction, that they simplify the analysis for deter-
mining the existence of prescriptive jurisdiction, and that they apply a
heightened standard of scrutiny for determining antitrust injury.
Through these analyses, this article will show that the Second Circuit
failed to consider the sovereignty of foreign nations and improperly ap-
plied United States law. Courts should exercise greater care in deciding
issues of jurisdiction and standing in future cases.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Consolidated Gold Fields is a complex case with multiple parties,
but which can be summarized by simply stating that Minorco made a
hostile takeover bid for Gold Fields. The plaintiffs are Consolidated
Gold Fields (Gold Fields), a British corporation which exports, mines,
and sells natural resources, primarily gold,' 8 and Gold Fields Mining
Corporation (GFMC), Gold Fields' wholly-owned subsidiary.10 The
crown jewel of Gold Fields' assets is its ownership of almost half of
Newmont Mining Corporation (Newmont),20 which, in turn, owns the
majority of Newmont Gold Company (Newmont Gold).2 Minorco is a
holding company 22 incorporated in Luxembourg that is largely con-
trolled by Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. and De
Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.23 The Minorco group is the largest
17. See infra notes 124-68 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of target
standing).
18. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 255. Although Gold Fields is a British
corporation, half of Gold Fields' assets are located within the United States. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Gold Fields owns 49.3% of Newmont Mining Corporation (Newmont). Id.
21. Id. Newmont, incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, owns
90% of Newmont Gold Company (Newmont Gold), the largest gold producer in the
United States. Id. Furthermore, Gold Fields and its associated companies, including
Newmont, make up the second largest gold producer in the western world. Id. Gold
Fields owns a substantial number of shares in the three gold mining companies: It has
a 49% interest in Newmont; a 38% interest in Gold Fields; and a 49% interest in
Renison. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Minorco at 7, Consolidated
Gold Fields v. Minorco, 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-7932 (L),-7934) [herein-
after Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Minorco].
22. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 255. The majority of Minorco's share-
holdings are in companies which produce and export natural resources. Id.
23. Id. Anglo American and De Beers are both South African companies. Id. An-
glo American has a 39.1% interest in Minorco and De Beers has a 21 % interest. Id. In
addition, the South African Oppenheimer family has a 7% interest in Minorco and
allegedly controls Anglo American, De Beers, and Minorco. Id. Anglo American par-
ticipates in extensive gold mining operations. Id. In addition to these interests, the Op-
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non-communist producer of gold in the world 24 and owned almost
thirty percent of Gold Fields before the proposed merger.20
In October 1988, Minorco began negotiations for the purchase of
Gold Fields' stock. A small portion of the stock was owned by United
States residents. 6 In its purchase offer, Minorco made a concerted,
overt effort to avoid all contacts with the United States in order to
prevent American courts from applying United States antitrust laws. 27
Despite this attempt, Gold Fields, Newmont and Newmont Gold
sued for a preliminary injunction28 in district court.29 The takeover
penheimers have a large number of family members an the boards of the companies
involved in this action. Id.
24. Id. Minorco holds a 20.3% concentration in the non-communist gold produc-
tion market. Id. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellce Minorco, supra
note 21, at I1 (explaining that gold is supplied to world markets from several sources,
including non-communist mine production, official reserves, scrap recovery, private in-
vestors, and centrally-planned economies). Mine production from non-communist
sources supplies a very small fraction of the world's gold. Id.
25. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 255.
26. Id. United States residents owned 2.5% of the outstanding stock. Id. Minorco
attempted to buy 213.4 million shares, 5.3 million of which were owned by United
States residents. Id. Only 50,000 of these shares were directly owned by residents, the
remaining shares were held through nominee accounts in the United Kingdom (3.1
million) and through the ownership of American Depository Receipts (ADR) (2.15
million). Id.
27. Id. at 256. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee Minorco, supra
note 21, at 45-49 (stating that Minorco intentionally took every precaution to avoid any
announcement or other publicity of the tender offer in the United States). Minorco, in
its offering documents, stated that the offer was not going to be made directly or indi-
rectly "by use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce or of any facilities of a national securities exchange of the United States of
America, its possessions or territories or any area subject to its jurisdiction or any polit-
ical sub-division thereof." Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256. The press re-
lease about the offer stated, "[n]ot for distribution in the United States," and the offer-
ing materials stated that the offer did not extend to Gold Field's American Depository
Receipts. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee Minorco, supra note 21, at 45.
Minorco provided United States shareholders offering documents through United
Kingdom nominees. Consolidated Gold Fields. 871 F.2d at 256. Minorco stated in its
offering documents that it would accept tender offers from United States residents only
if the acceptance form was mailed from outside of the United States. Id. Furthermore,
Minorco did not participate in any oral or written communications with American me-
dia and there were no direct communications between Gold Fields' ADR holders and
Minorco. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Minorco, supra note 21, at 44.
Despite these actions, the district court still claimed personal jurisdiction over Minorco.
Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496. The Second Circuit agreed and stated
that the results of these actions outside of the United States had a foreseeable impact
on events inside the United States and, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction was valid.
Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
28. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 503 (citing Savage v. Gorski,
850 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1988); Jackson Dairy v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72
(2d Cir. 1979) (providing the criteria for the granting of preliminary injunctions).
Courts will grant a preliminary injunction provided that the plaintiffs prove (a) irrepa-
rable harm and (b) either (I) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently
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would have resulted in Minorco acquiring substantial control of the
non-communist gold production market.3 0 The court granted the plain-
tiffs' requested injunction, thereby preventing Minorco from proceeding
with its tender offer.3 1 The court concluded that while Minorco did not
satisfy the requirements for general jurisdiction, it did meet the criteria
for specific jurisdiction because Minorco purposely directed its takeover
offer to purchase Gold Fields at residents in the United States, includ-
ing shareholders and Newmont.32 The court also held that even though
Newmont and Newmont Gold had met antitrust standing requirements
under the Clayton Act, Gold Fields and GFMC did not suffer the in-
jury necessary to attain standing, and in fact, would have the opportu-
nity to reap enormous benefits as a result of the increased market
power.33 Thus, the district court denied them standing on the antitrust
claims.
3 4
serious questions regarding the merits which would make them fair to litigate along
with hardships of the party asking for the injunction. Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F.
Supp. at 493.
The court in this case found that Newmont and Newmont Gold satisfied these re-
quirements because the proposed takeover would result in Gold Fields' substantial con-
trol of the market. Id. at 503. Any takeover that results in a 30% or higher control of
the market is considered to have a prima facie negative impact on competition. Id. at
495-97. Thus, the court found that Newmont and Newmont Gold demonstrated a like-
lihood of success on the merits. Id. Additionally, the court held that plaintiffs demon-
strated irreparable harm because it is impossible to "unscramble the eggs" subsequent
to a takeovers' consummation. Id. Furthermore, plaintiffs satisfied the minimum re-
quirements for sufficiently serious questions regarding the merits because plaintiffs
could face imminent harm from a decrease in competition in the world gold market
resulting from the takeover. Id.
29. Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 489-90 citing, among other statutes,
violations of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1988), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
30. Id. at 503
31. Id. at 503-04.
32. Id. at 496; see also infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (stating that in
order to confer general jurisdiction, defendant's contacts must be systematic and con-
tinuous). See also infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (stating that in order to
prove specific jurisdiction, plaintiff must prove that defendant purposefully directed the
disputed activities toward the forum).
33. Id. at 499-500. The district court held that Gold Fields' and GFMC's claims
were meritless because they found it was illogical to assume that these parties would
face any injury due to the company's increased market power. Id. at 499. Additionally,
the court stated that Gold Fields' argument that it would suffer harm derivatively from
the independent companies that it partially owned was counter-intuitive. Id. Gold
Fields would no longer exist to feel the consequences of anticompetitive practices. Id.
34. Id. at 499. In addition, the court held that the fraud claims, alleging that mis-
statements in the tender offer might mislead United States investors, lacked prescrip-
tive jurisdiction. Id. at 496-97. When applying federal securities law to the interna-
tional transaction, the court applied the "conduct test" and the "effects test." Id. at
496. The conduct test considers the nature of the conduct occurring within the United
States related to the claimed fraudulent activities. Id. Under this test, the court held
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The Second Circuit addressed neither the disputed claims conferring
personal jurisdiction to Minorco nor the conflicts concerning the grant
of prescriptive jurisdiction to Minorco."8 It did, however, grant anti-
trust standing to Gold Fields and Newmont Gold under the Clayton
Act. 6
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Second Circuit's analysis in Consolidated Gold Fields raises is-
sues regarding the jurisdictional requirements for the extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust laws. 7 In order for a defendant
to be subject to general jurisdiction, there must exist a relationship be-
tween the defendant, the forum, and the claim.38 If such a relationship
does not exist, the defendant's contacts must be systematic and contin-
uous.3 9 Two elements must be established in order to assert specific
personal jurisdiction over a foreign party in an antitrust case.' 0 First,
that Minorco did not partake in more than incidental activities relating to this fraud,
assuming such claims were valid. Id. Although the court found there was sufficient
contact between Minorco and United States residents to grant personal jurisdiction, the
alleged fraudulent statements did not occur within the course of those contacts. Id.
When applying the effects test, the court found that because Americans held only
2.5% of the shares in question and Minorco avoided any contact with the United
States with regard to the purchase of these shares, the effect of the alleged fraud in
connection with the transaction was too minimal to confer standing. Id. at 496-97. In
this decision the court stated that "[w]e cannot believe that Congress would have in-
tended the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws to apply if [an American citizen]
in London had defrauded a British investment trust by selling foreign securities to it
simply because half of one percent of its assets was held by Americans." Id. at 496-97
(quoting ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975)). Thus, the fact that
an insignificant number of Americans owned the stock is not sufficient to confer pre-
scriptive jurisdiction for the securities claims. Id.
The Second Circuit reversed this decision when it held that plaintiffs did in fact have
prescriptive jurisdiction for the securities claims. 871 F.2d at 263. This note will not
address the validity of the securities law holding, as it pertains exclusively to the anti-
trust claims contained in this case.
35. See generally Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d 252 (showing that the court
failed to address jurisdictional concerns which the parties argued on appeal).
36. Id. at 260.
37. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 493-94, 497 (discussing require-
ments for personal jurisdiction and general jurisdiction). When transactions involving a
foreign corporation's potential antitrust violations, such as in Consolidated Gold
Fields, are raised in United States courts, the court must first establish personal juris-
diction. Id. at 493. If personal jurisdiction is granted, then the court must determine
whether it should hear the case based on the chance for its success on its merits. Id. at
493-94.
38. Id. at 493.
39. Id. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (establishing the standards
for the "long arm" application of personal jurisdiction).
40. Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496.
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the plaintiff must show that the connection between the defendant and
the United States is the result of the defendant's purposeful, directed
actions toward the United States.41 Second, the plaintiff must show
that the antitrust injury arose out of the defendant's contacts with the
United States.42 The Second Circuit's assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion over Minorco is questionable because, as Minorco protested in dis-
trict court, its ties with the United States were minimal.4'3 Notwith-
standing the fact that Minorco argued the issue, the court of appeals
did not address personal jurisdiction in its opinion.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S BASIS FOR GRANTING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
To find personal jurisdiction, the district court first inquired as to
Minorco's qualifications for "general jurisdiction. 4 5 The court consid-
ered the sufficiency of Minorco's contacts with the United States and
held that Minorco had insufficient contacts to warrant the exercise of
general personal jurisdiction.46 The court reasoned that Minorco's con-
tacts were insufficient because Minorco was not licensed to do business,
nor did it have an office, in the United States.47 Notwithstanding its
41. Id. In Keeton v. Hustler, the Supreme Court found the Due Process require-
ment satisfied, that fair warning had been given, "if the [out-of-forum] defendant had
purposefully directed his activity to residents of the forum." Keeton, 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984).
42. Id. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court
required a claim be "related to or 'arise[] out or a defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum." Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
43. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Minorco, supra note 21, at
43 (arguing that Minorco had insufficient ties with the United States to confer jurisdic-
tion over it).
44. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 255. The court does not discuss jurisdic-
tional issues in its summary of its holding. Id.
45. Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 493-94. See supra note 38 and ac-
companying text (discussing jurisdictional requirements).
46. Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 493. Independent of the validity of
prescriptive jurisdiction, a court must decide whether it can lawfully assert judicial
authority over specific entities. Griffin, supra note 11, at 321. If a defendant is not
subject to personal jurisdiction of the court, no civil action can proceed. Id. Under the
Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court established that when a defendant is not pre-
sent in a forum's territory, "minimum contacts" of a certain nature and quality must
exist in order not to offend notions of "fair play and substantial justice." International
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In applying the minimum contacts test,
courts determine whether it is fair and reasonable to demand that a party defend itself
in the forum, and whether the defendant engaged in an action that was purposely di-
rected at the forum. Griffin, supra note 11, at 321-22, citing International Shoe, 326
U.S. at 316.
47. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 494-95 (expanding on the no-
tion of no minimum contacts with its United States forum). Minorco is not registered
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denial of personal jurisdiction, the district court justified the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over Minorco because of Minorco's inter-
mittent relationship with Newmont over a period of seven years, in-
cluding meetings in the United States which were likely related to the
takeover of Minorco.4 8 When applying a traditional in personam juris-
dictional test, it appears that the district court unjustly asserted in per-
sonam jurisdiction over Minorco because Minorco's contacts with the
United States were not systematic and continous and because there was
no nexus between the actual tender offer regarding Gold Fields and any
forum in the United States."
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS' FAILURE TO ADDRESS PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
On appeal, Minorco argued that the district court erroneously exer-
cised specific jurisdiction over it because Newmont's claim satisfied
neither of the elements required. 0 The first element was not met be-
cause there was no purposeful contact between Minorco and the United
States in connection with Minorco's attempted takeover of Gold
Fields. 1 Minorco contended that mere foreseeability or awareness that
United States residents would be affected was not an adequate stan-
dard upon which to confer personal jurisdiction.5 2 Furthermore, Mi-
on any United States stock exchange and the trading of its stocks through American
Depository Receipts is not a result of any act by Minorco itself. Id. at 494.
48. Id. at 494-95. The court asserted specific personal jurisdiction because it be-
lieved that Minorco knew its actions, including work with Newmont, retention of
United States financial services, and financing of the merger, would have an impact on
the United States. Id. at 495.
49. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (establishing the criteria for "long
arm" imposition of in personam jurisdiction as requiring systematic and continuous
contact and a nexus between the action and the forum).
50. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, Minorco, supra note 21, at 43-
44. Minorco stated that in order to satisfy specific jurisdiction, defendant must pur-
posely direct the activities that caused the litigation to the residents of the forum and
that an act that simply has foreseeable consequences in the forum does not satisfy this
requirement; there must be a substantial connection between the forum and the defend-
ant; and the injury must be proximately caused by those contacts. Id. at 44. In this
case, Newmont must demonstrate a substantial connection between the United States
and Minorco's takeover bid, and that Newmont's antitrust injury arose from Minorco's
contacts with the United States. Id. Minorco asserts the record does not support such a
finding. Id. at 44-45.
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining that Minorco, with re-
spect to its offer, did not exercise any written or oral communication with the Ameri-
can media or with the holders of Gold Fields' ADRs).
52. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Minorco, supra note 21, at 45.
Minorco advocated this view even though it likely knew that the British nominee record
holders and ADR's depository banks would inform American beneficial owners and
ADR holders about the offer. Id.
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norco argued that it was inappropriate to consider a third party's activ-
ities (here, the British record holders, who would forward the takeover
offer to Americans) as a basis for claimed jurisdiction. 53 Finally, Mi-
norco asserted that the second prong of the test was missing because
the limited contacts with the United States were not the direct cause of
the alleged antitrust injury, the takeover bid.54
Minorco further argued that the district court placed too great an
emphasis on Minorco's contacts with Newmont, 55 instead of focusing
on contacts originating from the actual tender offer. 56 The district court
exercised in personam jurisdiction over Minorco, a wholly foreign en-
tity, based on its somewhat insubstantial contacts with Newmont. "
The Second Circuit failed to address the question of personal juris-
diction in Consolidated Gold Fields. The court simply ignored the ob-
vious jurisdictional problems inherent in any case in which the United
53. Id. at 46. Minorco cited Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984), in which the Supreme Court found that unilateral activity
by a third person cannot be used to determine whether a defendant has sufficient con-
tacts with a forum. Id.
54. Id. at 45-47. Minorco stated that the district court found the following to be
the extent of Minorco's contacts with the United States: (1) its intermittent courtship
with Newmont; (2) its use of American investment bankers in 1981; (3) its unsuccess-
ful attempts to meet with the chairman of Newmont subsequent to the offer; (4) its
filing under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) in connection with the secondary acqui-
sition of the Newmont block of shares which Gold Fields owned; and (5) the plan to
use Chemical Bank for the transaction. Id. at 46-47. Minorco asserted that these con-
tacts were insufficient to render it subject to specific in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 47.
Minorco also asserted that its contacts with Newmont were irrelevant. Id. The action
in question was the bid for Gold Fields, not Newmont. Id. Minorco's post-offer at-
tempts to meet with Newmont did not constitute sufficient contacts because they had
taken place merely to neutralize Newmont's response to the offer and therefore were
unrelated to the claimed antitrust injury. Id.
Minorco's HSR filings were also irrelevant because there was no nexus between the
alleged injury and the filings. Id. Gold Fields was required to make this filing in con-
nection with the secondary acquisition of Newmont because of the magnitude of Gold
Fields' shareholding interest in Newmont. Id. Furthermore, any activity with Chemical
Bank regarding the financing of the transaction was not a jurisdiction-conferring con-
tact because of the Supreme Court's decision to reject contact based on the financing of
any activity. Id. at 48. See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding
that an alien's purchase of 80% of its helicopter fleet in the forum was insufficient
basis for specific jurisdiction for a claim resulting from a helicopter crash).
55. Id. at 494-95. The district court emphasized Minorco's 7 years of takeover-
related activity with respect to Newmont, while discounting Minorco's efforts to avoid
contacts with the United States. Id.
56. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, Minorco, supra note 21, at
46-47 (stating that Minorco's pre-offer contacts with Newmont should be considered
irrelevant). Minorco alleged that it had insubstantial contacts with the United States
insofar as its attempted buyout of Gold Fields was concerned. See id. at 47 (noting
that the only contact with the United States pertaining to the attempted takeover of
Gold Fields was a financing arrangement with the Chemical Bank of New York).
57. Id.
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States claims jurisdiction in a takeover bid between two foreign compa-
nies. By doing so, the Second Circuit has created a disturbing prece-
dent through which the American judiciary may increasingly infringe
upon foreign nations' sovereignty.5 8
C. GRANTING PERSONAL JURISDICTION-A POLICY CHOICE
There are a number of policy considerations judges must consider
when determining jurisdictional questions, 9 especially when foreign en-
tities are involved. A court must look at the actual controversy, weigh
its impact on the forum, and consider the message it sends to other
courts and to foreign entities.60 Had the Second Circuit found that the
exercise of jurisdiction over Minorco was unreasonable, the alleged vio-
lations of the tender offer still could have been litigated in foreign
courts possessing substantial contacts with the parties involved."' Thus,
the court should have considered this alternative when granting juris-
diction. Instead, the district court and the court of appeals directly in-
fringed on the sovereignty of a wholly foreign entity.
The Supreme Court has specifically discouraged such judicial activ-
ism. In Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, the Court held that
the United States jurisdictional claims over a dispute between Chinese
and Japanese entities was unreasonable, unfair, and in violation of the
Due Process clause because there must be at least minimum contact
between the forum and the entities.62 The Asahi opinion and its mini-
58. See Note, Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick and the Act of State
Doctrine: An Elusive Standard, 5 Ahi. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 133 (1989). [hereinafter
Note, Environmental Tectonics] (examining the Act of State Doctrine). The court
failed to address the sovereignty issue when it did not distinguish between crossing
state lines and crossing national lines.
59. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 487, 493; Brief of Defendant-
Appellant, Cross-Appellee, Minorco, supra note 21, at 43-49 (discussing the different
policy options regarding the exercise of jurisdictional boundaries).
60. See infra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing judicial jurisdictional
considerations).
61. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 255 (noting that Minorco was a
Luxembourg corporation which owned a 29.9% stake in Gold Fields, a British corpora-
tion). Furthermore, Minorco's tender offer was aimed at outstanding Gold Fields'
stock, most of which was held in nominee accounts in the United Kingdom. Id. Both
the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, as well as other forums, had substantial con-
tacts with Minorco, and therefore, could have litigated this matter. Id.
62. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1028 (1987). The
Court held that minimum contact between the forum and the defendant was required
in order to meet due process demands. Id. at 1031, citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). The court also required a defendant to pur-
posely expose itself to the forum out of a desire to benefit from the contact. Asahi, 107
S. Ct. at 1031. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process requirements
restricts a court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction if such exercise offends notions
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mum contacts requirements have not gone without criticism, however.
Some scholars assert that the minimum contacts requirement is too re-
strictive because it limits jurisdiction based on geographic distance
rather than the defendant's actual inconvenience in getting to the fo-
rum.13 This view, however, overlooks the primary policy reason for lim-
iting United States personal jurisdiction claims: deferrence to the sov-
ereignty of nations and protection from bias, real and perceived,
against non-American parties in United States courts.64
The conflict in Consolidated Gold Fields regarding personal jurisdic-
tion represents the growing over-extension of United States antitrust
law. In pursuing its desire to decide this case, the Second Circuit ne-
glected consideration of Minorco's insubstantial contacts with the
United States and failed to follow the Supreme Court's in personam
guidelines as set forth in Asahi. 5 Courts should be cautious when
claiming jurisdiction because it may weaken the foundations upon
which the policy of personal jurisdiction stands and impinge upon the
sovereignty of foreign nations.
of fair play and justice. Id. at 1033, citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). When determining whether claims of
jurisdiction offend these notions, the court must consider the burden imposed on the
defendant, the forum state or nation's interests, and the plaintiff's interest in getting
relief. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033-34. Other factors include the judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient form of relief and the interest in establishing sound
social policy. Id. at 1034, citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 44 U.S. 286,
292 (1980). Furthermore, the unique burdens of a foreign entity litigating in a unfa-
miliar judicial system should be weighed more heavily in assessing the reasonableness
of extending jurisdiction over national borders. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034. After assess-
ing these factors, the court determined that, in the international context, the exercise of
jurisdiction would not be equitable: The burden on the foreign defendant substantially
outweighed the slight interests of the forum and the plaintiff. Id. at 1035.
63. See Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction down the Tubes, 23 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 55, 70-71 (1988) (discussing the need to increase the ability of state courts
to claim personal jurisdiction). Critics like Weintraub believe that the proper determi-
nant of exercising personal jurisdiction should be demonstrated unfairness above and
beyond simply the inconvenience of crossing territorial boundaries. Id. at 70.
64. See Note, Environmental Tectonics, supra note 58, at 133 (examining the Act
of State Doctrine). See Kleinberg, The Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust
Laws of the United States, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 187, 194 (1985) (ex-
plaining that the Act of State Doctrine establishes that certain acts of state are valid
and unchallengeable due to the concept that one nation will not "sit on the judgments"
of another nation's government). This defense has been successful in claims dealing
with nationalization of property, foreign policy, and public policy. Id.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (providing the Supreme Court's
guidelines in Asahi).
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III. THE CASE FOR PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION
Prescriptive, or "subject matter," jurisdiction allows a court to claim
jurisdiction based on the issues raised by a complaint, rather than on a
defendant's contact with the forum.66 In an international antitrust case,
courts must determine whether the challenged conduct involves trade
or commerce with foreign nations6 7 before it can ultimately decide
whether prescriptive jurisdiction exists. American courts have inter-
preted "commerce" to mean "every species of commercial intercourse
between the United States and foreign nations."6 8 Thus, antitrust law
applies to almost all types of commercial transactions between the
United States and a foreign nation.6"
An area of inquiry unique to the cases involving foreign parties is the
issue of comity.70 In Consolidated Gold Fields, neither the Second Cir-
cuit nor the district court seriously considered judgments of the Euro-
pean Community and British regulatory authorities, who believed that
the tender offer would not have any anticompetitive effect on the rele-
vant market.7 1 Thus, both courts failed to apply the comity analysis
appropriate in extraterritorial applications of United States antitrust
law and required in United States securities law. 2 By not discussing
the issue, the Second Circuit impliedly established that a comity analy-
sis is unnecessary when considering the application of United States
66. See Griffin, supra note 11, at 317 (explaining prescriptive jurisdiction in the
international context).
67. Sherman Act, 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
68. See Griffin, supra note 11, at 318 citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat)
1, 7 (1824) (observing that the courts have interpreted "commerce" broadly pursuant
to Congress' constitutional authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce).
69. See Griffin, supra note 11, at 318 (noting that the antitrust laws apply to im-
port, export, and investment transactions between the United States and any foreign
nation).
70. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979) (defining comity as a will-
ingness to respect or to give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another court as
an act of good will).
71. See Callcott, supra note 4, at 928 (explaining the finding of foreign govern-
ments). After the district court granted the preliminary injunction, the British secre-
tary of state for Trade and Industry requested that the bid be investigated by the Mo-
nopolies and Mergers Commission in order to evaluate potential anticompetitive effects
on the strategic metals market in the United Kingdom. Consolidated Gold Fields. 871
F.2d at 254 n.1. Under British law, Minorco was prohibited from proceeding with the
tender offer until the completion of the investigation. Id. On February 2. 1989, the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission announced that the proposed acquisition would
not violate British public interest by the imposition of anticompetitive side effects in the
market. Id. Thus the only obstacle which stood in Minorco's way was the preliminary
injunction issued and affirmed by the United States' courts. Id.
72. See Callcott, supra note 4, at 928-29 (discussing the need for comity principles
to be applied in international antitrust cases).
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antitrust law to foreign tender offers. 3 This precedent will only exacer-
bate existing confusion in the area and become more of a problem as
the number of transnational tender offers increases.
A. THE GRANTING OF PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION
Both parties in Consolidated Gold Fields raised the issue of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction in their appellate briefs. Gold Fields argued that the
tender offer had substantial effects on the United States market, 7 but
ignored the issue of international comity.7 5 Minorco indirectly ad-
dressed prescriptive jurisdiction in its attempt to defeat personal juris-
diction, since without personal jurisdiction a party cannot acquire sub-
ject matter jurisdiction." The Second Circuit's failure to explore the
issue of prescriptive jurisdiction establishes a precedent for ignoring the
issue in antitrust suits against foreign tender offers.
B. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST LAW
The Second Circuit was the first federal appellate court to address
international considerations in an antitrust context in the landmark
case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)." Alcoa
73. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256-61 (making no mention of the
need to perform a comity analysis). The court did use the principle of comity to resolve
the securities law claims. Id. at 262.
74. Brief for Appellees and Cross Appellants at 51, n. 63, Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-7932 (L), -7934) [herein-
after Brief for Appellees and Cross Appellants, Consolidated]. Gold Fields argued that
Minorco was aware of its requirement to furnish Gold Fields' shareholders with tender
share documents and that as a result of the tender offer, the price of Gold Fields'
ADRs jumped significantly. Id.
75. See id. at 49-54 (making no mention of comity in its argument in support of
the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over Minorco).
76. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross Appellee Minorco, supra note 21, at 43-
49. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (explaining that
there can be no in personam jurisdiction if a defendant has no contacts with the said
jurisdiction). Thus, in the absence of personal jurisdiction, prescriptive jurisdiction is
irrelevant. Id.
77. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Prior
to this decision, courts relied on American Banana v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347
(1909), in which the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to activ-
ity occurring outside of the United States. 213 U.S. at 357-58. In the Court's opinion,
Justice Holmes stated that the imposition of the Sherman Act upon foreign activity
would be unjust because it would interfere with another sovereign country's authority.
Id. at 356. The Court also adopted the position that the determination of the lawful-
ness of an entity's act should be determined by the country in which the act occurred.
Id.
It is not surprising that the ramifications of American Banana were limited because
it did not address the possibility that foreign transactions could have effects within the
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enunciated an "effects test" of prescriptive jurisdiction under antitrust
laws.7 8 Under the effects test, the United States has prescriptive juris-
diction over foreign activities if the alleged violative conduct is intended
to have effects in the United States. 9 As later sections will address,
other courts have found the effects test overly expansive and have de-
veloped alternative tests that incorporate comity considerations." The
Second Circuit ignored these alternative tests and in fact ignored the
entire issue.
C. APPROACHES TO WEIGHING FOREIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR
PRESCRIPTIVE ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
1. Federal Circuit Court's Treatment
Although the federal circuits are not in agreement as to the proper
test for transnational tender offers, many recognize that comity issues
should be considered before extraterritorially applying United States
antitrust laws.8 1 The Ninth Circuit considered foreign interests in
Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America (Timberlane 1). 82 The court
United States, a possibility which grew with the internationalization of commerce.
Comment, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 25 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 177, 179 [hereinafter Comment, Extraterritorial Application], citing American
Banana, 213 U.S. at 356.
78. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 81-123 (explaining the comity analyses used by various courts
and other legal authorities).
81. See id. (discussing, among other things, federal courts' treatment of comity).
82. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) re-
manded, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Timberlane I), afJ'd, 749 F.2d 1378
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) (Timberlane 11). This case in-
volved a claim by plaintiffs, an Oregon partnership and two of its Honduran subsidiar-
ies, that their operations in Honduras were paralyzed because of a judicial proceeding
by defendants in Honduras. Timberlane II, 749 F.2d at 1379. Timberlane's allegation
was that Bank of America officials, located in the United States and Honduras, at-
tempted to stop Timberlane, via its subsidiaries in Honduras, from milling Honduran
timber for export to the United States. Id. The Bank of America performed this al-
leged activity by refusing to transfer its interest in a timber enterprise in which
Timberlane also had an interest. Id. Timberlane asserted that Bank of America did this
to defend its interests in rival timber enterprises and force Timberlane out of business.
Id. at 1380. The court found that the defendants' intent was to interfere with the
American lumber business, thus affecting the United States' commerce. Timberlane I,
549 F.2d at 601. The court, in Timberlane I, held that the district court improperly
dismissed the case even though the violation involved Honduran citizens, the alleged
activity took place in Honduras, and its economic ramifications were felt in Honduras.
Id. at 615. There was no indication of conflicts with Honduran law or policy or sub-
stantial interest between the United States and Honduras. Id.
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developed the "rule of reason" test,83 which requires the court to bal-
ance United States interests with those of other nations in deciding
whether to apply United States antitrust laws.84
Timberlane rs facts parallel those of Consolidated Gold Fields; both
cases involved alleged antitrust violations by foreign entities operating
outside of the United States. 5 In fact, the Second Circuit used
Timberlane I to support the comity analysis it used to address the se-
curities law claims in Consolidated Gold Fields.16 Therefore, the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision not to apply the "rule of reason" test to the anti-
trust issues presented to it in Consolidated Gold Fields does not seem
consistent or logical.
In Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp.,87 the Third Circuit devel-
oped a different test for determining prescriptive jurisdiction in anti-
83. Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d at 613. This test is three pronged. Id. First, the trial
court decides whether there is an effect, either actual or intended, upon United States
commerce. Id. Second, the court evaluates whether the United States antitrust laws
properly controlled the restraint of trade. Id. Finally, the court determines whether to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction based on international comity. Id.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Timberlane I approach in Montreal Trading Ltd. v.
Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit became the first circuit
to deny extraterritorial jurisdiction under the rule of reason, or balancing, test. Id. at
869-70. In this case, a Canadian corporation brought suit under section four of the
Clayton Act against Canadian subsidiaries of American potash producers. Id. at 865.
Under the balancing test, the Tenth Circuit determined that the alleged violations had
little effect on United States commerce while comity considerations were substantial.
Id. at 870. Thus, the Tenth Circuit expressly indicated that a lawsuit would be dis-
missed when comity considerations outweighed the first two prongs of the balancing
test. See generally, Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Juris-
diction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegal Extension of the Judicial Ex-
tension Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 399 (1983) (discussing the concept of inter-
national comity).
84. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 613. The relevant factors the court suggests weigh-
ing include: (1) the amount of tension which exists between United States and foreign
law or policy; (2) the citizenship or allegiance of the parties and the locations or pri-
mary places of business for corporations; (3) the point at which regulation by either
state may achieve compliance; (4) the relative importance of effects on the United
States as compared to those elsewhere; (5) the extent to which there is express intent to
hurt or adversely affect American commerce; (6) the foreseeability of such an effect;
and (7) the relative significance of action within the United States as compared with
action abroad. Id. at 614.
85. Compare Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d at 603-05 with Consolidated Gold Fields,
871 F.2d at 255-56 (introducing the respective parties and verifying their foreign status
and alleged activities).
86. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 263. The court stated that it was an
established principle of international and domestic law that a court can choose not to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction when the remedy's extraterritorial effect is so dispro-
portionate with the harm within the United States that it violates principles of comity.
Id.
87. Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). This
suit concerned patent infringement and fraudulent representation, and considered pat-
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trust suits.88 The Third Circuit inquires first whether there is jurisdic-
tion, and second whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is appropriate
in light of international comity considerations.8 ' Although the
Timberlane I and Mannington Mills tests seem similar, they are based
on fundamentally different concepts. The Timberlane I approach looks
to the establishment of jurisdiction,"0 while the Mannington Mills ap-
proach weighs comity considerations after jurisdiction is established in
order to decide whether to enforce it.9 The Second Circuit used Man-
nington Mills and Timberlane I to support the necessity of a comity
analysis for the securities claims in Consolidated Gold Fields,2 but
extended neither case to the antitrust claims in Consolidated Gold
Fields.93
In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Uranium Antitrust 1),94 the
district court chose not to adopt either of the above tests, but instead
ent office activity in the United States, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
Id. at 1294.
88. Id. at 1294-97.
89. Id.
90. See Comment, Extraterritorial Application, supra note 77, at 183, citing
Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 613 (noting that the three-part rule of reason test deter-
mines if prescriptive jurisdiction is present).
91. See id. at 184-85, citing Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294 (explaining that
even though prescriptive jurisdiction may be present, comity considerations must still
be evaluated to determine whether to assert such jurisdiction).
92. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d. at 262. In addition to the tests set forth.
there are various defenses that international businesses may raise when challenged
under United States laws. Kleinberg, supra note 64, at 193. This rule has been nar-
rowed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which establishcd that
such immunity does not extend to litigation generated from commercial activity. Id.
American courts have defined commercial activity broadly. See id. (observing that
courts have determined that conduct such as a government's procurement of cement on
the open market was "commercial").
Another defense is the Act of State Doctrine. Id. at 194. The Act of State Doctrine
establishes that certain acts of state are valid and unchallengeable due to the concept
that one nation will not "sit on the judgments" of another nation's government. Id.
This defense has been successful in claims dealing with nationalization of property,
foreign policy, and public policy. Id. Compulsion is another defense that is employed
when a foreign government coerces a defendant into participating in anticompetitive
behavior. Id. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, which permits parties to bring lawsuits,
petition, and lobby without any threat of antitrust claims, is another defense. Id.
93. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256-61 (ignoring comity considera-
tions with respect to the antitrust claims). The court's inconsistency is unusual because
its analysis of the securities law claims was very thorough. Id. at 261-63.
94. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. 111. 1979) (Ura-
nium Antitrust I), aff'd 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (Uranium Antitrust I1). In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation involved suits filed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation
against 29 defendants. In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.
II1. 1979). Westinghouse charged that foreign uranium producers had created a cartel
that attempted to force Westinghouse out of the public utilities market. Id.
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relied on the Alcoa effects test.9 5 The Seventh Circuit, in Uranium An-
titrust II, modified the district court's opinion, stating that the court
could not apply the jurisdictional test because the foreign defendants
defaulted.96 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has not settled the question of
which prescriptive jurisdiction test it will adopt. 97 Despite the lack of a
solid endorsement for a specific test, Uranium Antitrust I is important
to the analysis of Consolidated Gold Fields because it demonstrates
the analysis the court used in its consideration of the various prescrip-
tive jurisdiction tests.
Another relevant international antitrust case is Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.98 In Laker Airways, a British corpo-
rate plaintiff raised conspiracy and antitrust claims against several
American and European passenger air carriers. 99 The court of appeals
95. Uranium Antitrust I, 480 F. Supp. at 1148; see also supra note 80 and accom-
panying text (explaining the effects test).
96. Uranium Antitrust 11, 617 F.2d at 1255-56. This decision was limited to its
facts because the defendants defaulted and their respective countries enacted legisla-
tion to prevent the enforcement of the United States' decree. Uranium Antitrust 1, 480
F. Supp. at 1148. Thus, a balancing test regarding prescriptive jurisdiction was ren-
dered moot because of the direct collision between the United States and the foreign
countries involved. Id.
97. See Kleinberg, supra note 64, at 189, citing Uranium Antitrust If, 617 F.2d at
1255-56 (discussing the lack of resolution on foreign prescriptive jurisdiction in anti-
trust cases).
98. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
99. Id. at 916. Laker Airways (Laker) filed suit in district court, asserting that the
defendant air carriers conspired to destroy Laker's inexpensive transatlantic service
through predatory pricing practices. Id. The defendants included four American corpo-
rations, Pan American World Airways, Trans World Airlines, McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, and McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, in addition to four foreign
airlines: British Airways, British Caledonian Airways, Lufthansa, and Swissair. Id. at
917. The four foreign defendants filed suit in the United Kingdom's High Court of
Justice in an attempt to enjoin Laker from proceeding with its antitrust claims in
United States courts. Id. at 917-18. The High Court of Justice granted an interim
injunction barring Laker from participating in the British proceedings while simultane-
ously seeking redress in the United States. Id. at 918. This injunction was intended to
preserve the status quo pending the High Court's ruling on the merits of the British
defendants' suit regarding the dismissal of the American suit. Id. The injunction, how-
ever, resulted in Laker's inability to obtain discovery or file any pre-trial motions
against the British defendants. Id. Laker had earlier initiated a second antitrust suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines (KLM) and Societe Anonyme Beige d'Exploitation de la Navigation
Aerienne (Sabena). Id. Laker subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction in the
district court that prevented KLM and Sabena from participating in the English pro-
ceedings and protected the district court's jurisdiction over the Laker proceedings. Id.
The consequence of the district court's injunction was that KLM and Sabena were
unable to obtain an injunction against Laker's antitrust claims in the English Courts.
Id. KLM and Sabena appealed this injunction to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Id. Appellants claimed that the district court's action, which prevented
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determined that concurrent jurisdiction existed for the United King-
dom and the United States based on the grounds of territoriality and
nationality.110 The court recognized the legitimacy of international
comity principles, but determined that the balancing test under the
"rule of reason" approach was of no help in allocating control when
concurrent jurisdiction existed and in which two irreconcilable laws ap-
plied which must be resolved through political considerations." ° The
court held that the exercise of United States jurisdiction was valid due
to the important United States interests involved, that the district
court's preliminary injunction was necessary to preserve the court's ju-
risdiction, and that the injunction was not proscribed by principles of
international comity.
02
There are conflicting opinions concerning the D.C. Circuit's jurisdic-
tional analysis in Laker Airways. Some legal scholars believe that the
court rejected the "rule of reason" analysis, 10 3 while others suggest that
appellants from taking part in Laker's antitrust suit in England, violated international
comity. Id. at 921.
While this appeal was pending, the British secretary of state for Trade and Industry
invoked the British Protection of Trading Interests Act (PTIA). Id. See Note, The
Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional "Rule of Reason" Applied to Transna-
tional Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 645, 657 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Laker Antitrust Litigation] (noting that the PTIA empowered the secretary of state to
issue orders prohibiting any person doing business in the United Kingdom from adher-
ing to United States antitrust laws). Prior to the enactment of PTIA, the British High
Court dissolved the previous injunctive orders, holding that United States jurisdiction
was proper. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 919. This action compelled the British defend-
ants to request an emergency appeal in which the injunctions were restored. Id. at 920.
Laker unsuccessfully appealed this matter to the English Court of Appeals, which held
that the PTIA was valid. Id. Ultimately, Laker's antitrust claims against the British
defendants in the British courts were enjoined. Id.
100. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 921 (noting that jurisdiction is universally
recognized as a country's right to control activities within its boundaries). Territorial
jurisdiction can also be asserted in the regulation of conduct physically contained
within a territory, but whose effects are felt outside the territory. Id. A state can also
regulate conduct that occurs outside its borders but has effects within those same bor-
ders. Id. at 922.
101. See id. at 948-49 (concluding that it was not the courts' place to weigh the
purely political factors at hand). Concurrent jurisdiction exists when two or more states
have legitimate interests and jurisdictional claims in a dispute. Laker Airways, 731
F.2d at 921. The court reasoned that the United States jurisdiction was based on the
alleged conspiracy's impact on American commerce. Id. The court found the primary
basis for the United Kingdom's jurisdiction was the nationality of the parties in Laker's
complaint. Id. at 921-26.
102. Id. at 955-56.
103. See Klienberg, supra note 64, at 193; Barbolak, Laker Airways: Recognizing
the Need for a United States-United Kingdom Antitrust Treaty, 4 DicKiNsoN. J. INT'L
L. 39, 52-55 (1985) (discussing why the court rejected the rule of reason test).
Klienberg suggests that the evolution of the effects requirement over the last 40 years
reflects on Congress' choice to limit antitrust law application of United States busi-
nesses. Kleinberg, supra note 64, at 187. Barbolak believes that because antitrust laws
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the court implicitly applied the "rule of reason" analysis.1"4 The very
existence of such disputes underscores the important role analysis of
competing interests play in determining whether United States courts
should claim subject matter jurisdiction in a particular dispute. The
policy issues surrounding jurisdiction should not be ignored.
2. Department of Justice's Treatment
The United States Department of Justice has also addressed the is-
sue of prescriptive jurisdiction for international antitrust disputes in its
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(Guidelines). 0 5 The Guidelines provide that United States antitrust
laws will not be applied to foreign transactions unless there is a "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect"' 06 on United States corn-
reflect strong political sentiments, a bilateral antitrust treaty between the United States
and Great Britain is necessary to provide antitrust guidelines. Barbolak, supra, at 40.
104. See Note, Laker Antitrust Litigation, supra note 99, at 658 (finding that
Judge Wilkey's supposed rejection of the rule of reason test, when scrutinized in the
case's context, is an implicit adherence to this rule). The court shifted the focus of the
interest balancing analysis away from political factors and toward the suitability of
injunctive relief, thereby employing the rule of reason approach in order to protect
United States jurisdiction. Id. at 658-59.
105. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDELINES OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 35 (1988) [hereinafter ANTI-
TRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES] (stating that the Guidelines are designed to ensure
that the Justice Department's antitrust enforcement policy will not limit non-controver-
sial business transactions or avoid arrangements that might ultimately benefit the con-
sumer). The Guidelines also convey the Justice Department's commitment to prosecute
restraints of trade that do not benefit the consumer but that instead result in reduced
output and/or higher prices. Id. at 35-36.
The Guidelines state that the antitrust laws are not limited solely to conduct and
transactions that occur in the United States. Id. at 1. The Justice Department, how-
ever, recognizes that international comity considerations play a role in determining
whether a foreign sovereign will recognize the United States' legislative, executive, or
judicial acts within its territory. Id. at 31, citing Hilton v. Buyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164
(1895).
106. Id. at 29, citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). The Guidelines furnish a thorough
explanation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), which provides
that the Sherman Act shall not apply to the export activities of American companies
unless such activities have a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
domestic or import trade or commerce and said effect supports a claim under the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 30. Thus, the FTAIA grants prescriptive jurisdiction over American
export firms' conduct that seriously impacts American trade or commerce, Id. Further-
more, as a general rule, the Justice Department deems a situation involving a case in
which a government pays for more than half of the cost of the transaction to have a
serious impact on the United States, thereby supporting prescriptive jurisdiction. Id. at
30-31.
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merce. The Justice Department, in its comity analysis, will investigate
a foreign jurisdiction's laws when such laws are applicable.
10 7
Had the Second Circuit adopted the Justice Department's approach
when it analyzed Consolidated Gold Fields, it would have considered
Britain's Monopolies and Mergers Commission's investigation of the
Minorco bid which concluded that the merger would not produce anti-
competitive consequences in the United Kingdom.108 The Second Cir-
cuit should also have considered Britain's general hostility toward the
imposition of United States antitrust laws on British corporations.10 9
These factors should have demonstrated Britain's substantial interest in
and antipathy toward the application of American antitrust laws to
British entities and caused the Second Circuit to consider these issues
when determining whether it was proper to apply United States anti-
trust law to Minorco's tender offer.
107. Id. at 32, citing Revised Recommendation of the [OEDC] Council Concern-
ing Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affect-
ing International Trade, OECD Doc. No. C(86) 44 (Final) (May 21, 1986); Memoran-
dum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect
to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, United States-Canada,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) 13,503. The Guidelines require the Justice
Department to scrutinize, where reasonably possible, a foreign jurisdiction's interests
before advocating a United States claim of jurisdiction. Id. The Guidelines state that
United States antitrust law can be applied when actions affect United States interstate
commerce, import trade or commerce, or export trade or commerce of a person en-
gaged with the United States in trade or commerce. Id.
108. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 254 n.l (explaining Britain's Mo-
nopolies and Mergers Commission's report on Minorco's proposed tender offer).
109. See Barbolak, supra note 103, at 55-64 (suggesting that the conflicts existing
between the United States and the United Kingdom can best be remedied through the
creation of a bilateral treaty). The United States' interest in fostering competition in-
creasingly conflicts with foreign nations' resentment of such "legal imperialism". Id. at
56-57, quoting Note, The Inconvenient Forum and International Comity in Private
Antitrust Actions, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 399, 400 (1983). Therefore, the United States
and the United Kingdom should adopt a treaty similar to the Australia-United States
Agreement on Cooperation in Antitrust Matters and the Canada-United States Memo-
randum of Understanding with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws.
See id. at 57 (arguing that the Australian-United States Agreement and the Canada-
United States Memorandum demonstrate that the tensions created by extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust laws can be alleviated through international ne-
gotiations and intergovernmental arrangements).
Recommended provisions for such a treaty include: (I) intergovernment notification
of antitrust law implications; (2) a consultation provision; (3) required consideration of
the opposing nation's interests; (4) notification before thwarting discovery requests: (5)
opinion letters from the Department of Justice; (6) limitations on United States discov-
ery procedures; (7) government participation in antitrust suits and United States gov-
ernment recommendations regarding the imposition of treble damages. Id. at 57-63. A
bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom will help terminate
the "antitrust cold war" between these two nations. Id. at 63.
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The Guidelines contain further instruction from which the Second
Circuit might have benefitted. The Guidelines pose various scenarios
involving international antitrust disputes, followed by the Justice De-
partment's recommended response.110 One scenario, remarkably similar
to the facts in Consolidated Gold Fields, involves a merger of two for-
eign firms.' 1 ' According to the Guidelines, because the extraterritorial
application of American antitrust laws may create conflict with foreign
nations, decisionmakers should respect those nations' interests when de-
ciding whether to apply American antitrust law." 2 Had the Second
Circuit followed the Guidelines in deciding Consolidated Gold Fields,
it would have considered legitimate foreign interests thereby confirming
the importance of the principle of comity in assessing whether to chal-
lenge Minorco's tender offer." 3
3. The Restatement's Treatment
The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law's" 4 (Restatement)
approach to the application of United States antitrust laws is similar to
that contained in the Timberlane I case." 5 Sections 402, 403, and 415
of the Restatement set forth respectively the grounds supporting the
exercise of jurisdiction," 6 the principle of reasonableness in relation to
110. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 105, at 37-86 (con-
taining 18 international antitrust scenarios and the Justice Department's extraterrito-
rial application of United States antitrust law to such scenarios).
I11. Id. at 45-46.
112. Id. This does not mean that the Justice Department will never apply United
States antitrust laws to completely foreign mergers that negatively affect competition
in the United States. Id. Rather, it will consider the facts of each case in making this
determination. Id. For example, the Department will scrutinize a merger between for-
eign firms if either one maintains production plants or has significant product distribu-
tion operations in the United States. Id. at 45-46. The Justice Department may consult
the appropriate foreign governments as to their views concerning the impact of alterna-
tive remedies on the country's national interests. Id. at 46. Additionally, foreign firms
whose assets are used to produce and sell products outside of the United States may
still be required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to file premerger notification with
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. Id.
113. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 252 (failing to consider foreign
interests when deciding to exercise jurisdiction over the tender offer).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS].
115. See Comment, Extraterritorial Application, supra note 77, at 200 (explaining
how Timberlane I and the Restatement's approach are similar). These approaches are
comparable in that they consider comity and effects when determining the reasonable-
ness of the exercise of jurisdiction. Id.
116. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 114, § 402. Section 402 pro-
vides that, subject to section 403, a state can assert jurisdiction over: (1) activity that
occurs within its borders; (2) persons or property interests located within its borders;
(3) activity beyond its borders that has or is intended to have significant impact within
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the exercise of jurisdiction, 1 7 and the foundations governing jurisdic-
tion that are pertinent to United States antitrust law."'8 Thus, the Re-
statement suggests that the principal grounds supporting jurisdiction
are territoriality, nationality, and the effects test, whereby a court can
exercise jurisdiction over activities occurring outside of the United
States if there are actual or intended effects in the United States.'""
Furthermore, the Restatement asserts that a state cannot unreasonably
exercise jurisdiction even if the principal grounds for jurisdiction are
present. 120 If a state can exercise jurisdiction, but such an exercise
would lead to jurisdictional conflict, then the first state must balance its
its borders; (4) conduct, interests, status, or relations of its citizens beyond and within
its borders; and (5) specific activity beyond its borders by non-citizens aimed against
the safety of the state or certain other state interests. Id.
117. Id. § 403. Section 403 establishes that a state may not assert jurisdiction con-
cerning a person or activity possessing contacts with another state when the assertion of
such jurisdiction is not reasonable. Id. Whether assertion of jurisdiction is not reasona-
ble is decided by adjudging such factors as: (i) the activity's connection to the regulat-
ing state (i.e., the extent to which it occurs within said state or significantly or
foreseeably impacts said state); (2) the links, such as citizenship, residence, or ceo-
nomic conduct, between the regulating state and the individual primarily responsible
for the activity to be regulated, or between said state and those whom the regulation is
intended to serve; (3) the type of conduct to be regulated and the significance of the
regulation to the regulating state; (4) the presence of valid expectations that may be
adversely or beneficially affected by the regulation; (5) the significance of the regula-
tion to the international political, economic, or legal structure; (6) the extent to which
the regulation conforms to traditions of the international legal structure; (7) whether
another state may have a stake in regulating the activity; and (8) the probability of
contradicting regulation existing in another state. Id.
Where it is not unreasonable for two states to assert jurisdiction over an individual or
an activity, but the legal prescriptions issued by the two states are in conflict, each
state should ascertain its interests, as well as the interests of the competing state, in
asserting jurisdiction in accordance with the above factors. Id. A state should defer to
the competing state if that state's interest is definitely more substantial. Id.
118. Id. § 415. Section 415 adapts the principles enunciated in sections 402 and
403 to United States regulation of anti-competitive activity. Id. comment a. Any activ-
ity or accord in the restraint of American trade that occurs substantially in the United
States is subject to United States jurisdiction, regardless of the citizenship or business
location of the parties to the accord or of the participants in the activity. Id. Any
accord in restraint of American trade entered into outside the United States, and any
activity or accord in restraint of such trade that occurs substantially outside the United
States is subject to United States jurisdiction, if a primary goal of the activity or ac-
cord is to obstruct American commerce and such activity or accord impacts American
commerce. Id. Any other accord or activity in restraint of American trade that sub-
stantially impacts American commerce is subject to United States jurisdiction if the
assertion of such jurisdiction is not unreasonable. Id.
119. Id. §§ 402, 403, 415. See Comment, Extraterritorial Application, supra note
77, at 198, citing RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 114, § 401(a) (find-
ing that courts can find jurisdiction through the application of the prescribing state's
law to "activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things"
by said state's legislative, executive, or judicial branch).
120. Id. § 403(2).
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interests against the other state's interests.121 If the state finds that the
other state's interests are greater, then it should decline to assert juris-
diction. 122 The Restatement incorporates much of the effects test and
international comity considerations into its analysis of the reasonable-
ness of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction.1
23
Had the Second Circuit followed the Restatement's approach in de-
ciding Consolidated Gold Fields, it should have reviewed territorial
and nationality concerns and applied the effects test. Even if the court
had found prescriptive jurisdiction under these criteria, it would then
have considered comity principles. Despite the 1986 Restatement revi-
sion-shortly before the Second Circuit's Consolidated Gold Fields
opinion-the Second Circuit did not refer to the Restatement.
The Second Circuit completely ignored the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion analyses enunciated in the Restatement, in the Guidelines, and in
a number of federal circuit court decisions. These analyses were devel-
oped to foster the principle of international comity, and by disregarding
these considerations, the Second Circuit encouraged the further expan-
sion of United States antitrust law into the domain of foreign
sovereigns.
IV. THE OVER-EXTENSION OF ANTITRUST LAW BY
GRANTING STANDING TO A TARGET COMPANY
Antitrust standing is based on the existence of an injury and that
injury's proximity to the antitrust action. 2 " In Blue Shield of Virginia
v. McCready,125 the Supreme Court stated that only those directly af-
121. Id. § 403(3).
122. Id. The Restatement divides conduct restraining trade into three categories:
conduct in the United States, conduct outside the United States intended to obstruct
American commerce and which does in fact impact American commerce, and any con-
duct that substantially impacts American commerce. Id. See Bell, The Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Law and International Aviation, A Comity of
Errors, 54 J. AIR L. & CoM. 533, 569-70 (1988), citing RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, supra note 114, at § 415 (explaining the Restatement's approach).
123. See Comment, Extraterritorial Application, supra note 77, at 200 (noting
that under the Restatement's approach, a court determines the existence of jurisdiction
under the effects test). The reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction is adjudged
through a review of the factors enumerated in § 403(2) and a determination of whether
another state's interests are definitely stronger. Id.
124. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 38 (explaining basic antitrust standing
principles).
125. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 465-66 (1982) (holding that
petitioner, an insurance policy holder, had the right to file suit against her insurance
carrier under section four of the Clayton Act because the insurer's practice of reim-
bursing policy holders for psychiatric treatment but not psychological treatment repre-
sented an illegal conspiracy against psychologists in contravention of section one of the
Sherman Act and this practice injured the petitioner).
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fected by an alleged antitrust violation have standing to maintain an
action for the recovery of treble damages for injury to their business or
property.126 The Court decided that standing exists if "there is an eco-
nomic and physical nexus between the alleged violation and the harm
to the plaintiff."1 27 The decision in Consolidated Gold Fields chal-
lenges the McCready standing requirements by giving a target com-
pany the right to bring a claim without the antitrust violation actually
causing it harm.
28
A. HISTORIC APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST STANDING
The United States Supreme Court established the foundation for an-
titrust standing in 1977 in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc. when it held that the threat of profit loss did not constitute anti-
trust injury to a competitor.129 In Brunswick, the Court held that the
respondents (plaintiffs below) lacked standing to pursue their claims. 130
The Brunswick Court emphasized that antitrust laws are designed for
the protection of competition, not competitors.'3'
In 1986, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Cargill, Inc.
v. Montfort of Colorado.13 2 Under Cargill, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that it is threatened by the type of injury that the antitrust laws
were designed to protect in order to have standing for injunctive relief
under section sixteen of the Clayton Act.13 3 Thus, in order to evaluate
126. See id. at 477-78 (explaining that because neither the statute itself nor its
legislative history reveal which injuries are too remote, the court would have to employ
a "proximate cause" analysis).
127. Id. at 478.
128. See id. at 465-66 (discussing the requirement that only those directly affected
by antitrust violations have standing to bring an action).
129. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977). In this
case, a major bowling equipment manufacturer started to acquire a substantial number
of defaulting bowling centers that would have failed had they not been acquired. Id. at
479-80. Competing bowling centers claimed antitrust injury under section four of the
Clayton Act because they would suffer a loss of profits if the acquisitions stood. Id. at
480-81.
130. Id. at 489.
131. Note, Antitrust Standing of Target Corporations to Enjoin Hostile Take-
overs Under Section 16 of The Clayton Act, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1039, 1045 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Antitrust Standing] citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
429 U.S. at 489, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
132. Cargill v. Montfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1986).
133. Id. at 113, citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. The Court stated that Congress
has condemned mergers only when they may produce anticompetitive effects. Bruns-
wick, 429 U.S. at 487. Thus, it is imperative to separate the anticompetitive effects of a
merger from all other effects when evaluating the application of antitrust law. See id.
(acknowledging that every merger can potentially result in adverse economic conse-
quences for some competitors).
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the Second Circuit's decision to grant standing to Gold Fields and
GFMC, it is necessary to investigate these plaintiffs' claims and deter-
mine whether they suffered an injury and whether antitrust violations
were the proximate cause of their injury.
B. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF GOLDS FIELDS' STANDING
In Consolidated Gold Fields v. Anglo American Corp,' the district
court denied standing to target Gold Fields, but granted standing to
Newmont.135 The court reasoned that Gold Fields would suffer no eco-
nomic harm and would, in fact, reap economic benefits because Mi-
norco's acquisition of Gold Fields would make Gold Fields part of a
more competitive economic unit.1' The district court's refusal to grant
standing to Gold Fields was a disputed issue on appeal.
The Second Circuit modified the district court's decision and granted
standing to Gold Fields.' 37 The court held that Gold Fields would be
threatened by antitrust injury if the merger occurred because it would
be unable to compete independently in the gold production market.13 8
The court also stated that the merger would cause Gold Fields to lose
"one of the vital components of competition-the power of independent
decision-making as to price and output.' 39 This decision is question-
able because the goal of United States antitrust law is to protect com-
petition. In this case, that requires considering the competition within
the gold production market. The court, however, disregarded this goal
in order to protect the company from competitors.
134. Consolidated Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
135. Id. at 499. The court rejected Gold Fields' antitrust claim that, as a result of a
merger, it would be compelled to defend antitrust suits and would thus suffer injury
due to this result. Id. The court also rejected Gold Fields' claim that it would suffer
antitrust injury due to Anglo's added market power, reasoning that, if anything, Gold
Fields would benefit from this situation. Id. Additionally, the court refused to hear
Gold Fields' claim that it would be derivatively harmed by the anti-competitive injury
that defendants would inflict on the companies that Gold Fields partially owned be-
cause Gold Fields would no longer exist to suffer the effects. Id.
The court, however, agreed that Newmont and Newmont Gold would suffer antitrust
injury because Anglo might halt Newmont's production in order to increase production
in its South African mines to reap higher profits. Id. at 499-501. This would lead to
higher prices for defendants. Id. The court also stated that Newmont would suffer in-
jury because the proposed merger could lead to Anglo controlling approximately one-
third of the non-communist world gold market, thus reducing Newmont's ability to
compete. Id. at 499-500.
136. See id. at 499 (contending that it "defies logic" to believe that a company
wholly owned by another will endure injury from that company's augmented market
strength).
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Opponents of target standing share the opinion that the injuries
which Gold Fields and GFMC claimed it would suffer are not the type
which antitrust laws are designed to protect. 140 Judge Altimari, who
dissented in Consolidated Gold Fields on the issue of standing, stated
that the target's loss of power to control its decision-making was not an
injury sufficient to support an antitrust claim. 14' The claimed injuries
were not of the type that would result from a reduction in competition.
Rather, they are a natural outcome of any merger, whether the merger
would result in a complete dominance of the relevant market or in only
a tiny fraction of it.
142
Section seven of the Clayton Act"" states that anyone engaging in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce is forbidden to directly
or indirectly acquire any portion of stock or other share of capital when
it may result in a substantial lessening of competition, or creation of a
monopoly.' Accordingly, courts should determine the validity of an
antitrust claim on the basis of whether the proposed merger would re-
sult in anticompetitive effects that would injure the plaintiff. 4  Al-
though a target may be significantly affected by a merger, it is unlikely
that it will suffer from the merger, because it will become part of the
same combination it argues will have a tremendous competitive advan-
tage following the merger.' 46
Furthermore, the statutory language concerning the standards for in-
jury under section four of the Clayton Act regarding injunctions is too
broad to provide a precise standard to apply to these situations. This
lack of a statutory standard causes circuits to differ regarding the
threshold of injury required for injunctions as compared to treble dam-
age suits. Notwithstanding these disagreements, standards within the
scope of the Clayton Act's protection of competition are necessary.
4 7
140. See id. citing Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.
1983); ADM Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980); Carter
Hawley Hale Stores v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that
these decisions support the rule that a target cannot argue that it will suffer antitrust
injury because following the takeover it will become a component in the same entity
that it contends will have a tremendous competitive advantage).
141. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 264.
142. Id. at 264.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Gold Fields claimed that Minorco violated this sec-
tion. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 254.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
145. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
146. Id.; see also Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo American Corp., 698 F.
Supp. 487, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that Gold Fields lacked antitrust standing).
147. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (noting that there is no clear expression of
congressional intent with respect to whether section four of the Clayton Act encom-
passes "all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers"); Note, Competitor Standing
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C. DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF AN INJURY
Targets of hostile tender offers frequently sue unfriendly suitors in
order to thwart the takeover action.148 These targets make a variety of
claims about the effect a takeover will have, including that it will im-
pair recruitment, performance, and morale, substantially displace man-
agement, cause trade secrets to be lost, and disturb business opera-
tions. 4 These claims, while plausible securities and other legal claims,
have not traditionally constituted antitrust injuries. 50 If such claims
under Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. An Erosion of the Clayton Act, 37
AM. U.L. REV. 259, 262 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Competitor Standing under Car-
gill] (pointing out that the standard of proof for an antitrust injury is the same for
claims under both sections four and 16); Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at
1047 (expanding on the differences between target suits for treble damages under scc-
tion four versus those for injunctive relief under section 16, and supporting the general
skepticism regarding target suits).
The distinction between the allowance of injunctive relief for antitrust claims under
section 16 of the Clayton Act and violations under section four of the Clayton Act,
which gives parties the right to sue for treble damages for antitrust violations, is in
sharp dispute. See Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1042-49 (describing
the divergent applications by the Supreme Court, which declined to adopt a per se rule,
and lower courts). Although lower courts have generally applied a less rigid standard
for standing under section 16 than under section four, this does not warrant an aban-
donment of all standing requirements which pray for injunctive relief for antitrust vio-
lations. See also Cargill v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1986) (finding
that the injuries deserving relief are the same under both sections four and 16); see
also Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1047 (indicating that Cargill recog-
nizes that the standing analysis will not always be identical under sections four and
16).
This would defeat the Clayton Act's intended purpose: to prevent the lessening of
competition. See Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1057 (finding that the
Supreme Court's actions acknowledged the Clayton Act's purpose of promoting eco-
nomic competition and facilitating consumer welfare). Special scrutiny should be exer-
cised with respect to the validity of standing for target corporations that raise antitrust
claims. Id. at 1045, citing Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 n.4 (2d Cir.
1981); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
1980); Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 288 (3d Cir. 1978);
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1970), affid, 405 U.S.
251 (1972).
148. See Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 110, 114 (1986) (indi-
cating that target management often employ lawsuits against unfriendly suitors as a
tactical weapon of defense). The author's own study of management responses to hos-
tile takeover attempts revealed that almost two-thirds of these responses involved anti-
trust lawsuits. Id. Many courts understand that these antitrust lawsuits are merely de-
fensive weapons.against hostile takeovers. Id. at 116. One federal district court denied
a target's motion for a preliminary injunction against the suitor on such grounds. Id.,
citing D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,711 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
149. Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1050-51.
150. See id. at 1051 (contending that claims such as loss of trade secrets, disrup-
tion of corporate business, and the like do not represent antitrust injury because they
do not derive from the possibility of significantly reduced competition). In D-2 Invest-
ment Co. v. Holloway, the court stated that the enforcement of these claims should be
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are valid, they may not be proper for the target management to raise as
a response to a hostile takeover's possible antitrust effects, because the
targets may not suffer the injury of reduced competition."5'
Furthermore, courts are often skeptical about antitrust suits brought
by target management. 152 If there is a true injury to the target, then it
is likely to be shared by competitors who would join in the suit against
the bidder.'53 In Consolidated Gold Fields, however, no independent
gold producers joined in the suit against Minorco.'" This indicates that
Gold Fields may have been less concerned about the antitrust implica-
tions of Minorco's tender offer than it was about protecting itself from
an attempted takeover.
Target management does not always file antitrust suits in bad faith
in order to entrench itself; they may actually believe that a takeover is
not in the shareholders' best interests. 55 This does not appear to be the
case, however, in Consolidated Gold Fields. The Second Circuit found
that Gold Fields' standing was based on the threat of losing its "inde-
pendent decision-making power as to price and output"'"" which it er-
roneously considered a concern of antitrust law." 7 The court confused
management's desire to preserve control, prestige, wealth, and firm spe-
cific capital with shareholders' incentive to maximize wealth through
investment in the target. The court indirectly admitted this conflict of
interest when it stated that Gold Fields could have derived economic
benefit from its combination with Minorco if it had been allowed to
remain a distinct corporation within the greater Minorco
aggregation.' 58
left to the SEC or to the target shareholders. Rosenzweig, supra note 148, at 116,
citing [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,711 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
151. Rosenzweig, supra note 148, at 119.
152. Id. at 116-17.
153. Id.
154. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 252 (indicating that no indepen-
dent gold producers joined in the action against Minorco).
155. Rosenzweig, supra note 148, at 119-20.
156. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 258.
157. Id. The court misinterpreted the purpose of antitrust laws because it focused
not on ease of entry into a market but instead on the loss of one competitor from the
market. Id. Any merger can result in one less competitor in a market: the target. Id.
This, however, has no bearing on competition in the gold production market, which
should be the primary concern of this antitrust litigation. Id. See Note, Antitrust
Standing, supra note 131, at 1051 (indicating that antitrust injury relates to injury to
competition and not injury to competitors).
158. Id. at 258.
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D. TARGET LITIGATION'S NEGATIVE EFFECTS
ON SHAREHOLDERS
Whether target antitrust suits negatively effect the target sharehold-
ers' interests is a subject open to debate. When target antitrust litiga-
tion prevents potentially anticompetitve conduct it may ultimately im-
prove the target's shareholders' interests.159 This was likely not the
case, however, in Consolidated Gold Fields. The Second Circuit im-
plicitly acknowledged that Gold Fields' shareholders could have
benefitted from being a distinct part of the enlarged Minorco combina-
tion.160 By enjoining Minorco's bid, the court deprived Gold Fields'
shareholders of the substantial premium they would have received. 161
Additionally, Gold Fields undoubtedly incurred substantial legal costs
in battling the takeover, thus diminishing shareholder returns.6 2 Fur-
thermore, if a Gold Fields-Minorco merger is not anticompetitive, then
an opportunity was lost to have a more efficient gold market, which
benefits shareholders and society at large.' 63
Scholars differ as to how courts should handle the conflict that often
exists between a target management's interests and those of the target
itself and its shareholders in antitrust cases. Some legal scholars believe
that target corporations should never be permitted to sue for damages
or obtain injunctions under antitrust law because targets are never the
victims of reduced competition. 64 Other legal scholars believe that re-
stricting target litigation may be harmful because there are instances
where a target corporation may suffer an antitrust injury from the
merger.'6 5 For example, the target may suffer lost profits due to the
dominant firm's manipulation of prices following the merger in order to
159. But see Rosenzweig, supra note 148, at 131-35 (contending that target litiga-
tion harms the interests of the target's shareholders).
160. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d. at 258.
161. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Minorco, supra note 21, at
6 (noting that Minorco's initial tender offer for the outstanding Gold Fields stock it did
not own was 30% greater than the average stock price for the prior six months). Mi-
norco's bid, valued at $5 billion, was the largest in British history. Id.
162. Rosenzweig, supra note 148, at 135.
163. See id. at 140-43 (contending that target litigation is a tool through which
target management furthers its own interests, thereby depriving society of an efficient
allocation of resources).
164. Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1164 (1982). The sole purpose of antitrust law is to achieve
optimal allocative efficiency of economic resources. Id. Standing is based on a theory of
liability which depends on properly identifying a loss in allocative efficiency. Id. Prov-
ing antitrust injury to the target requires establishing a sufficient nexus between the
above loss and plaintiffs injury. Id. If the nexus is not adequately established, then
plaintiff cannot recover. Id.
165. Rosenzweig, supra note 148, at 144.
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force weaker competitors into a "profit[s] squeeze".1 8 Alternatively,
the target may claim an injury where there is a threat that the post-
merger entity will employ predatory pricing tactics.161 In these cases,
antitrust laws must apply. To do otherwise, would thwart the goal of
United States antitrust laws.
In Consolidated Gold Fields, however, the Second Circuit over-ex-
tended United States antitrust law by granting standing to a target
that did not suffer a direct antitrust injury.1 68 The Second Circuit's
decision to apply the Clayton Act outside its intended scope represents
an invasion into legislative authority. Therefore, courts should not look
to Consolidated Gold Fields as a precedent for determining the exis-
tence of an antitrust injury.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION-STRICTER
STANDARDS
The Second Circuit's failure to conduct a thorough analysis of Mi-
norco's claim that it had not had sufficient minimum contacts to war-
rant personal jurisdiction and the court's failure to incorporate princi-
ples of comity, set a dangerous predecent for resolution of international
antitrust cases. There are several actions courts should consider to slow
the judicial application of United States laws to foreign entities.
First, courts should develop a simple, enforceable jurisdictional stan-
dard for foreign antitrust claims, either on an international level or
through rewriting current United States laws. Second, takeover targets
must be subject to a higher level of scrutiny in antitrust actions. Third,
United States courts should address principles of comity in their opin-
ions, thereby creating precedent, granting due respect to the other na-
tions involved, and reducing the potential for backlash against United
States companies located in other nations.
16 9
166. Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1047-48.
167. Id. at 1048. A firm engages in predatory pricing when it prices below cost in
order to eradicate competitors in the short run, thereby lessening competition in the
long run. Id. at 1048, n.61.
168. See Note, Competitor Standing under Cargill, supra note 147, at 284 (1987)
(warning against erosion of the Clayton Act as a result of the Supreme Court's holding
in Cargill). But see Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1057 (concluding
that Cargill preserves the integrity of American antitrust law by serving its ultimate
purpose of fostering competition and facilitating consumer welfare).
169. See Brown, The Impact of European Community Antitrust Law on United
States Companies, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COip. L. REV. 383 (1990) (examining the
growing development of the European Community's extraterritorial application of its
antitrust laws on American companies).
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B. DEVELOPING PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS
The conflicts and inconsistencies seen in the cases reviewed demon-
strate a need for a simplified test for exercising prescriptive jurisdiction
in antitrust cases involving foreign entities. 170 These cases indicate how
American courts have combined well developed substantive federal and
state law with underdeveloped international law such as the principle of
comity.' 7 ' Although United States courts possess the authority to com-
bine these two areas of law, they have neither the experience nor, often,
the desire to ascertain and evaluate the interests of foreign
sovereigns. 171
It is imperative, however, that courts seriously consider all issues and
potential sources of conflict in international cases in which jurisdiction
is an issue.173 The problem of jurisdictional analysis should be simpli-
fied in order to avoid vague guidelines, and to encourage such analysis
so that courts will use it. 17  One solution is the creation of an interna-
tional policy for asserting prescriptive jurisdiction. 175 This policy could
be implemented through treaties between nations substantially affected
by the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws 76 or through an in-
ternational antitrust convention.
Once these international guidelines are established, they must be ad-
equately utilized and enforced. One way to effectively enforce them is
through a parajudicial device that would assist in weighing the poten-
170. See Aldisert, Federal Courts and Extraterritorial Antitrust Law: Enlightened
Self Interest or Yankee Imperialism?, 5 J.L. & COM. 415, 420-22 (1985) (discussing a
variety of factors that American courts rely on in deciding whether to apply our anti-
trust laws extraterritorrially and the consequent need for clear guidelines on the
matter).
171. Id. at 419.
172. Id. at 420.
173. Aldisert, supra note 170, at 424. The examination of the regulating interest
should consider its legal, political, social, historical, cultural, economic, and commercial
factors, as well as those of the foreign state. Id. at 424-25. The court should then weigh
the interests of the two states. Id. at 425.
174. Id. at 425. A possible formula is:
A state may not apply law to the conduct, relations, status, or interests of
persons or things having connections with another state or states when the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable is judged by identifying and weighing the considerations underlying
the regulatory interests of the state seeking jurisdiction with comparable interests
of the foreign state. If the interests of the foreign state are likely to be seriously
injured by the assumption of jurisdiction, then the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
Id.
175. Id. at 425.
176. See Barbolak, supra note 103, at 56 (expanding on the necessity for a United
Kingdom-United States antitrust treaty).
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tial injury to a foreign state. The applicable court could issue an order
of reference to an international panel that would investigate, report,
and file recommendations as to whether foreign interests would be
harmed if the court assumed jurisdiction.17 7 The courts then would util-
ize the advice of international legal experts and ease the tensions be-
tween foreign states and the United States without surrendering the
court's ultimate decision-making responsibility.
178
If a universal policy is not feasible, then the United States Congress
should consider amending current antitrust laws. The new law should
include a balancing test that would weigh jurisdictional antitrust con-
siderations on the international level. The goal of the law should be to
develop a simplified, consistent standard to apply to antitrust violations
involving foreign entities.
Consolidated Gold Fields illustrates the growing problems of apply-
ing United States antitrust laws to transnational mergers and acquisi-
tions. If a new standard is devised and properly applied, the United
States courts will be able to make a fair case by case analysis, thus
preventing outcomes such as that in Consolidated Gold Fields. The in-
consistencies in analysis among the federal circuits must cease. In order
for there to be an equitable application of antitrust law, legal experts
must come to terms with these problems and shortcomings and devise a
workable standard.
C. TARGET STANDING: JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND STRICTER
SCRUTINY NEEDED
In Consolidated Gold Fields, the Second Circuit over-extended
United States antitrust law by granting standing to a target corpora-
tion that had not suffered any antitrust injury. A solution to the di-
lemma presented by the case would be for courts to employ a height-
ened standard of scrutiny for target antitrust claims.179 The proper
177. Aldisert, supra note 170, at 430. This panel could consist of international law
experts from neutral and competing states, active and retired representatives from the
State Department and foreign ministers, active private international law practitioners,
and active and retired judges of the World Court. Id. at 431.
178. Id. at 431.
179. See Note, Standing Requirements Under the Clayton Act for Target Corpo-
rations Seeking Injunctions in Horizontal Mergers: Consolidated Gold Fields. PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 59 CIN. L. REV. 615 (1990) (proposing an alternative four part test for
granting target standing). Before a court grants standing it should find that the target
has met four criteria: (1) the merger would be anticompetitve and result in an antitrust
injury; (2) there is a causal connection between the antitrust violation and the claimed
injury; (3) the target has permission to sue on behalf of third parties, especially cus-
tomers, and can sue for relief along with the target. Id. at 637-40.
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focus of inquiry should be the adequacy of the target's claim that the
proposed takeover will violate United States antitrust laws based on
sufficient proof of antitrust injury. 8 ' Thus, courts should evaluate
whether the target's claimed injury is merely the natural result of a
merger, or is, in fact, the type of anticompetitive injury that antitrust
laws are designed to protect. Courts need to carefully analyze the facts
of each case to determine whether a target benefits from the takeover,
or whether it suffers antitrust injury and deserves standing to seek an
injunction under the Clayton Act.""
Under the suggested heightened scrutiny standard, the validity of the
Second Circuit's grant of standing to Gold Fields and GFMC would
have been questionable. As a result of the takeover, Gold Fields and
GFMC may lose their independent decision-making ability and auton-
omy. This, however, does not result in decreased competition due to
barriers of entry to the gold market, thereby constituting antitrust
injury.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust legal principles were not correctly applied in Consolidated
Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A. The Second Circuit failed to con-
sider the very plausible argument that Minorco's minimal contacts with
the United States vis-a-vis its tender offer were not sufficient enough
for the court to assert personal jurisdiction over it. Moreover, the court
did not balance United States and foreign interests as should be done
when deciding whether to grant prescriptive jurisdiction in extraterrito-
rial applications of American antitrust law. Furthermore, the Second
Circuit did not exercise any discretion in granting standing to a target
corporation that claimed to have suffered injuries not related to anti-
trust violations.
Consolidated Gold Fields demonstrates the unsettled nature of ex-
traterritorial application of United States antitrust laws. Although cur-
rent law could adequately and efficiently regulate the anticompetitive
tendencies which naturally arise in an open market, the steady growth
of mergers and acquisitions and transnational business activity compels
the further development of safeguards and standards to prevent the
over-extension of the United States antitrust laws. If American courts
continue to apply the law as they did in Consolidated Gold Fields,
such judicial activity will offend foreign entities and other parties to
180. Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 131, at 1056.
181. Id. at 1057.
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whom the law is applied. Thus, the adoption of stringent universal stan-
dards for the application of the United States antitrust law is
necessary.
